## AT: Militarization Critique

### AT: K Prior---2AC

#### Pragmatic, provisional claims are best---prioritizing epistemology make problem-driven approaches impossible.

David Owen 02. Reader of Political Theory at the Univ. of Southampton, Millennium Vol 31 No 3 2002 p. 655-7

Commenting on the ‘philosophical turn’ in IR, Wæver remarks that ‘[a] frenzy for words like “epistemology” and “ontology” often signals this philosophical turn’, although he goes on to comment that these terms are often used loosely.4 However, loosely deployed or not, it is clear that debates concerning ontology and epistemology play a central role in the contemporary IR theory wars. In one respect, this is unsurprising since it is a characteristic feature of the social sciences that periods of disciplinary disorientation involve recourse to reflection on the philosophical commitments of different theoretical approaches, and there is no doubt that such reflection can play a valuable role in making explicit the commitments that characterise (and help individuate) diverse theoretical positions. Yet, such a philosophical turn is not without its dangers and I will briefly mention three before turning to consider a confusion that has, I will suggest, helped to promote the IR theory wars by motivating this philosophical turn. The first danger with the philosophical turn is that it has an inbuilt tendency to prioritise issues of ontology and epistemology over explanatory and/or interpretive power as if the latter two were merely a simple function of the former. But while the explanatory and/or interpretive power of a theoretical account is not wholly independent of its ontological and/or epistemological commitments (otherwise criticism of these features would not be a criticism that had any value), it is by no means clear that it is, in contrast, wholly dependent on these philosophical commitments. Thus, for example, one need not be sympathetic to rational choice theory to recognise that it can provide powerful accounts of certain kinds of problems, such as the tragedy of the commons in which dilemmas of collective action are foregrounded. It may, of course, be the case that the advocates of rational choice theory cannot give a good account of why this type of theory is powerful in accounting for this class of problems (i.e., how it is that the relevant actors come to exhibit features in these circumstances that approximate the assumptions of rational choice theory) and, if this is the case, it is a philosophical weakness—but this does not undermine the point that, for a certain class of problems, rational choice theory may provide the best account available to us. In other words, while the critical judgement of theoretical accounts in terms of their ontological and/or epistemological sophistication is one kind of critical judgement, it is not the only or even necessarily the most important kind. The second danger run by the philosophical turn is that because prioritisation of ontology and epistemology promotes theory-construction from philosophical first principles, it cultivates a theory-driven rather than problem-driven approach to IR. Paraphrasing Ian Shapiro, the point can be put like this: since it is the case that there is always a plurality of possible true descriptions of a given action, event or phenomenon, the challenge is to decide which is the most apt in terms of getting a perspicuous grip on the action, event or phenomenon in question given the purposes of the inquiry; yet, from this standpoint, ‘theory-driven work is part of a reductionist program’ in that it ‘dictates always opting for the description that calls for the explanation that flows from the preferred model or theory’.5 The justification offered for this strategy rests on the mistaken belief that it is necessary for social science because general explanations are required to characterise the classes of phenomena studied in similar terms. However, as Shapiro points out, this is to misunderstand the enterprise of science since ‘whether there are general explanations for classes of phenomena is a question for social-scientific inquiry, not to be prejudged before conducting that inquiry’.6 Moreover, this strategy easily slips into the promotion of the pursuit of generality over that of empirical validity. The third danger is that the preceding two combine to encourage the formation of a particular image of disciplinary debate in IR—what might be called (only slightly tongue in cheek) ‘the Highlander view’—namely, an image of warring theoretical approaches with each, despite occasional temporary tactical alliances, dedicated to the strategic achievement of sovereignty over the disciplinary field. It encourages this view because the turn to, and prioritisation of, ontology and epistemology stimulates the idea that there can only be one theoretical approach which gets things right, namely, the theoretical approach that gets its ontology and epistemology right. This image feeds back into IR exacerbating the first and second dangers, and so a potentially vicious circle arises.

### AT: Liberal War---2AC

#### No liberal war---Dillon’s work is based on an interpretive disposition of suspicion, not empirics.

Stefan Borg 17. Postdoctoral research fellow in International Relations at the Department of Economic History, Stockholm University and an associated research fellow at the Swedish Institute of International Affairs. "Genealogy as critique in International Relations: Beyond the hermeneutics of baseless suspicion". SAGE Journals. 5-17-2017. https://journals-sagepub-com.proxy.library.emory.edu/doi/full/10.1177/1755088217707225

Genealogy, biopolitics, and the liberal peace

In the lecture series immediately following Security, Territory, Population, namely The Birth of Biopolitics, Foucault (2008) more narrowly focused on the shift from classically liberal to neoliberal forms of government emerging in the 1930s and growing in the 1950s, and how neoliberal governmentality worked by shaping subjectivity according to neoliberal economic imperatives (Foucault, 2008). Foucault’s preoccupation with biopolitics, understood as a general shift in modern liberal rule away from territory to population and life, has also inspired a number of IR scholars. Michael Dillon, Julian Reid, and Brad Evans, for instance, have examined the violent propensities inherent in liberalism, committed to a global war in the name of life itself (e.g. Dillon and Reid, 2009; Evans, 2010, 2011; Reid, 2006). Genealogy, understood as a form of critique played less of a role in the writings of Dillon and Reid, in part perhaps since Foucault was only one of many sources of inspiration for their writings. In Evans’ more programmatic writings on Foucault and liberal war, however, the genealogical commitments reminiscent of the first generation of post-structuralists clearly surface. In laying out the “liberal war thesis,” Evans explains,

Norms as such appear to be the logical outcome of reasoned political settlement. Our discourse of battle, however, appreciates that power defines the norm such that those who deviate from it pose a threat to the biological heritage of life. The norm is another way of suppressing political differences. There are then no universal, all-embracing, value-neutral, timeless, or eternal a priori norms that inhibit some purified and objective existential space where they await access by the learned justices of the peace. There is no absolute convergence point to human reason. Every norm is simply the outcome of a particular power struggle. (Evans, 2011: 751, and see Evans, 2010: 424)

A similar imagery is found in Vivienne Jabri’s (2010) biopolitical critique of the liberal peace project, which draws out the genealogical critique to issues of vital significance in IR, in particular the possibility of establishing a lasting global peace underpinned by international institutions, law, and norms. Since Jabri forcefully draws out the empirical implications of the genealogical disposition, her text warrants a closer examination.1 The liberal peace project, as is well known in IR, aims at promoting basic liberal values, such as the rule of law, the protection of human rights, and the establishment of democratic institutions worldwide. Jabri locates the origins of the renewed interventionist thought in former United Nations Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali’s Agenda for Peace from 1992, when absolute sovereignty was put into question following the end of the Cold War. To use Hedley Bull’s (1977) famous categories, the principle of Order understood as the unconditional upholding of the principle of sovereignty hence disallowing any (military) intervention, came to be challenged in the name of Justice, understood as a global project of making the world a somewhat better place. State sovereignty became increasingly conditional on the state’s ability to uphold basic human rights. Not only did liberals in IR perceive of the end of the Cold War as providing an opportunity for a global restructuring of relations between states (e.g. Kegley, 1993), in which such a tilt from Order to Justice would be possible, so did Frankfurt school oriented critical IR (e.g. Booth, 1991). Jabri then, uncontroversially, regards the 1990s discourse on humanitarian intervention, and the follow-up UN initiative from 2005 of a Responsibility to Protect (R2P), as important articulations of the liberal peace project.

Jabri’s (2010) genealogical critique of the liberal peace project starts from “the premise that to intervene at all in other societies is by definition colonial, suggestive of dispossession, racialised domination, and subjugation” (2010: 42). Thus, whether intervention takes the form of conducting air strikes or the sending of “armies” of advisors on how institutions best can uphold the rule of law, all forms of intervention is by definition illegitimate, since “the other” is deemed as irrevocably other and different from the “Western liberal self,” whose capacity for self-determination should not be violated. What Jabri wants to cast into doubt is the self-understanding of the liberal peace project as one of “rescue,” “care,” and “protection” that denies the “violence” inherent in the liberal peace project (2010: 42, 48). Jabri repudiates this benevolent understanding and instead proposes that the liberal peace project is “a project of war” which is primarily and ultimately driven by a biopolitical desire to manage populations. At the end of the day, Jabri asserts, the liberal peace project amounts to little more than a continuation of Western imperialism, thus a war against the other, fought in the name of humanity, and like the colonial European project aiming at the “management of populations through governmentality” (2010: 53, 54). To that end, the liberal project employs the twin pillars of, on the one hand, “military and carceral power” in the form of various police missions, and, on the other hand, “pedagogical power” as other forms of aid in constructing democratic institutions (2010: 54). Both forms of exercise of power though, partake in Euro-Western neo-colonialism.

In support of her thesis of the liberal peace project as one of war, Jabri’s argument rests on two particularizing moves with clear genealogical underpinnings. First, “the state” that the liberal peace project wishes to strengthen is seen as a Euro-Western way of organizing political life, ill-suited and alien to non-Western localities, and is thus to be understood as an imposition. Second and more importantly, “the human” which the liberal peace project seeks to protect is but one rendition of what the human may mean and ultimately resting upon a Kantian notion of “the autonomous rational individual” originating in the European Enlightenment (2010: 45). “The human” that the liberal peace project seeks to protect, Jabri notes, is not understood as “an empty space,” which can be endlessly filled with various articulations, but as an autonomous decision-maker, precisely the subject protected and thus conjured up in discourses of human rights (2010: 47). The force that is used in the liberal peace project (and any intervention in its name) is thus premised on a particular understanding of the human. Jabri contrasts this “rational subject” to a cultural subject; the “cultural” as she uses it then stands in for that which is beyond the grasp of Western liberal reason (2010: 47). She further notes that “the epistemological and ontological underpinning of the liberal peace project is precisely based upon a rationalist construction that is universal in its articulation” and “aims to shape societies so that they become self-governing entities within distinctly liberal lines” (2010: 47, 48). So, her main criticism is that the liberal peace project is premised upon and thereby constitutive of a particular subjectivity, namely the European liberal self, that now seeks to universalize itself. The liberal peace project places this subject in a position of hierarchy over non-liberal conceptions of self and society, and imposes it upon other localities from “the outside” (2010: 55). In so doing, it disallows other articulations of subjectivity and is hence understood as a form of violence even if not undertaken by military means.

The kernel of critique in the arguments examined ranging from the first generation post-structuralists to the later generation of Foucauldian scholars inspired by governmentality and biopolitics lies in the assumption that an alleged universal is nothing but a particular in disguise, which has forgotten, repressed, or refused its particularity, and in the claim to being or representing the universal does violence to various others. The assumption of conflicting particularities, which is pre-methodological and not inductively derived from the empirical work itself, is reflective of the ontological assumptions of genealogy conceived as a form of critique. To better understand what is at stake in making this assumption and ultimately being able to assume a critical distance to it, we need to turn to Foucault’s genealogical phase, which immediately preceded his writings on governmentality and biopolitics.

Foucault, genealogy, and critique

It should from the outset be clarified that my object of interrogation is not Foucault’s oeuvre as a whole but rather narrowly his genealogical phase, from his Nietzsche, Genealogy, History which appeared in print in 1971, until his lecture course “Society Must Be Defended” in 1975–1976. Some interpreters of Foucault have suggested that he abandoned the genealogical stance, in part due to the problems that I will raise here (e.g. Dean, 2010: 58; Lemke, 2012: 11–12). Mitchell Dean (2010), for instance, noticed that Foucault’s genealogical project of thinking social relations in the vocabulary of war, violence, and battle “found itself uncomfortably close to a position that tended to identify all forms of power with domination.” (2010: 58). No doubt, after “Society Must Be Defended” Foucault’s vocabulary changed from war, combat, and violence, to governance, governmentality, and conduct (Walters, 2012: 16). Foucault may in fact never fully have embraced the genealogical disposition himself. The critique that I advance is therefore not necessarily aimed at Foucault himself. Moreover, I shall not venture into the difficult debate on the extent to which Foucault was finally able to keep relations of power, violence, and domination analytically apart, but simply note that such questions were pressing concerns until the very end of his life (for a critical view, see Hanssen, 2000: 148–157). In what follows, I reconstruct the genealogical disposition, which Foucault elaborated in close dialogue with Nietzsche.

In Nietzsche, Genealogy, History, Foucault offers a reading of Nietzsche’s genealogy, while also laying bare his own philosophical commitments. The importance of the piece can hardly be exaggerated for understanding Foucault’s project (cf. Rabinow, 1984: 76). These commitments were to guide the only full-fledged genealogical work Foucault wrote, Discipline and Punish (Foucault, 1995 [1975]) as well as his second genealogical work, the first part of the History of Sexuality (Foucault, 1990 [1976]). To reiterate, genealogy appears less as a method in the sense of a set of rules that the researcher applies onto a historical material, but more as an ethos, a certain critical disposition. To begin with, genealogy opposes itself to the search for origins, since such a search “assumes the existence of immobile forms that precede the external world of accident and succession” (Foucault, 1984 [1971]: 78). In other words, the genealogist, along with Nietzsche, rejects substance ontology, where entities exist as already fully formed self-identical, monads. Instead he or she embraces an ontology of forces in perpetual movement and becoming without a telos (Schrift, 1996). Whereas a traditional historian seeks to trace “the beginning,” understood as uncovering some pure state of things, the genealogist, on the other hand, finds only “the dissension of other things” and “disparity” (Foucault, 1984 [1971]: 79). In this context, the genealogist will seek to “cultivate the details and accidents that accompany every beginning; it will be scrupulously attentive to their petty malice; it will await their emergence, once unmasked, as the face of the other” (1984 [1971]: 80). Thus, the genealogist subscribes to what Milbank refers to as a differential ontology where all identities are to be methodically disaggregated to demonstrate the estranged nature of identity (Milbank, 2006: 278–326). As Foucault (1984 [1971]) summarizes such a commitment, “history will not discover a forgotten identity, eager to be reborn, but a complex system of distinct and multiple elements, unable to be mastered by the powers of synthesis” (1984 [1971]: 94).

Furthermore, the genealogist refuses to see historical would be identities as teleologically predetermined. He or she instead discovers that “truth or being does not lie at the root of what we know and what we are, but the exteriority of accidents” (1984 [1971]: 81). The genealogist therefore does not treat emergence as a surface manifestation of a deep principle or essence realizing itself in history as coming into being where the endpoint of the movement is already immanent to the event itself. Contrasting the teleological disposition to the genealogical, Foucault (1984 [1971]) writes that whereas the former “would convince us of an obscure purpose that seeks its realization at the moment it arises [the latter] seeks to reestablish the various systems of subjection: not the anticipatory power of meaning, but the hazardous play of domination” (1984 [1971]: 83). Thus, the genealogist refuses the Aristotelian binary of essence and accident, in which a deep essence gradually comes to the surface, and if it is not doing so, it is due to contingent accidents, a theoretical figure which informs both liberal progressivism and Marxism. And history, in the genealogist’s understanding, is not the sum total of teleological or dialectical movements in which elements or forces are being reconciled. This would presuppose a principle of unity or intelligibility outside and beyond itself, which time makes present onto itself. To sum up, instead of reading history as progressive shifts according to a profound logic where the essence or telos of history realizes itself in surface manifestations that the philosopher deciphers, for the genealogist there is literally nothing “underneath” or “beyond” the contingent play of forces (Dreyfus and Rabinow, 1983: 104–118).

Drawing on Nietzsche’s notion of active and reactive forces, Foucault (1984 [1971]) understands emergence as “the entry of forces,” comprehended as a clash and confrontation between forces, which “do not belong to a common space” (1984 [1971]: 84–85). Thus, “in a sense, only a single drama is ever staged in this ‘non-place’, the endlessly repeated play of dominations” (1984 [1971]:85). How are we then to understand the emergence of this space of “non-place”? Such a space does not exist prior to the clash of forces; it is rather the battle itself which clears and opens it, and indeed the battle perpetually enacts a movement of clearing such a space (Dreyfus and Rabinow, 1983: 109). However, the relationship between forces is not a real “relationship”—since the forces have nothing in common—only an endless clash. And the place where this encounter occurs is not really a “place” at all, but an “inaccessible, impalpable, yet enabling non space.” The domination is therefore manifested throughout all of history “in meticulous procedures that impose rights and obligations” on some over others (Foucault, 1984 [1971]: 85; Hanssen, 2000: 46). This primordial endless clash of forces where “the strong” dominates “the weak” in a myriad of configurations provides the following rendition in which this relationship of domination, “makes itself accountable for debts and gives rise to the universe of rules, which is by no means designed to temper violence, but rather to satisfy it” (1984 [1971]: 85).

The clash of forces that constitutes this perpetual battle, it should be emphasized, is not a surface phenomenon which masks a deeper reality: it is literally all there is. Thus, at the beginning of every spatiotemporal order lies domination upheld by violence. This clash gives rise to the emergence of a “structured field of forces,” in which the battle continues in the rituals of power, inscribed in codes of conduct, in norms, values, traditions, and laws (Dreyfus and Rabinow, 1983: 110). The law and the norm that are presented as domesticating struggle and redressing injustices, are nothing more than temporary inscriptions of a relationship of domination. It should finally be made clear that power-as-forces stand in hierarchical relations of domination. After temporary ruptures in the structure of dominations, new structures of dominations emerge. A balance-of-power type of rough equilibrium between forces will not last (Hanssen, 2000: 97–157; and see Coole, 2000: 119–121).

In Truth and Juridical Forms, a lecture series given in Rio in May 1973, Foucault returns to Nietzsche when further elaborating on the possibilities of writing a historical rather than philosophical understanding of the subject. He emphasizes the radical break enacted between the activity of knowing and the supposed object of that knowledge. Instead of being a relation in which knowledge, so to speak, hooks onto the world, “[k]nowledge must struggle against a world without order, without connectedness, without form, without beauty, without wisdom, without harmony, and without law.” The relation between knowledge and the world to be known may “only be a relation of violence, domination, power, and force, a relation of violation” (Foucault, 2003 [1973]: 9). Foucault credits Nietzsche for breaking with the previously assumed harmonious relationship between knowledge and world, in which God ultimately stands as the underwriter of such as relation. Western philosophy, Foucault asserts, from Plato through Descartes and culminating in Kant, has always “characterized knowledge … by resemblance, by congruence, by bliss, by unity” (2003 [1973]: 12). This assumption of thinking in terms of “congruence, love, unity, and pacification” in fact makes the philosopher the person who is most likely to get things wrong since “[o]ne can understand what knowledge consists of only by examining these relations of struggle and power, the manner in which things and men hate one another, fight one another, and try to dominate one another, to exercise power relations over one another” (2003 [1973]: 12). The philosopher’s categories of unity, correspondence, truth, reason, and love only work to obscure the endless violent impositions of power-as-forces.

The genealogical ethos, as so far presented, occupies a central but ambiguous position in Foucault’s later work. On the one hand, the genealogical ethos is precisely what remains when his historicism is shed. In that sense, it seems entirely justified to describe it as an ontology (Oksala, 2012: 18–19). On the other hand, to talk about a Foucauldian ontology may appear self-contradictory since Foucault (2003 [1975–1976]) seeks to thoroughly historicize ontology and comes very close to a complete embrace of historicism (2003 [1975–1976]: 172–173). Foucault’s differential ontology of struggle, conflict, and violence must itself, in accordance with the historicist displacement of ontology, have a history. Ontology, on Foucault’s genealogical understanding, can, as Johanna Oksala notes (2012), be nothing but “a politics which has forgotten itself,” since every order is nothing but a temporary stabilization of clashing power-as-forces (2012: 35).

In his lecture course at Collège de France in 1975–1976, “Society Must Be Defended,” Foucault traces the contingent emergence of the genealogical ethos which enables him to undertake such a genealogy in the first place. In the course of the lecture series, Foucault expands on the genealogical ethos, delineated in Nietzsche, Genealogy, and History, and Truth and Juridical Forms, by historically tracing the emergence of the conditions that make such an understanding of history possible. Foucault (2003 [1975–1976]) devotes the majority of his lectures to tracing the emergence of a hypothesis, namely the hypothesis that, inverting Clausewitz’s famous dictum, politics is the continuation of war with other means (2003 [1975–1976]: 15). This is indeed the logical conclusion of the genealogical ethos that he, up to this point, only established “philosophically” through Nietzsche. This hypothesis, which he appropriately refers to as “Nietzsche’s hypothesis” entails that “[i]f we look beneath peace, order, wealth, and authority, beneath the claim order of subordinations, beneath the State and State apparatuses, beneath the laws, and so on, will we hear and discover a sort of primitive and permanent war?” (2003 [1975–1976]: 46–47). It is, throughout the lecture series, made clear that this is a discourse with which he sympathizes a great deal (e.g. 2003 [1975–1976]: 65, 111, 173; and see Hoffman, 2007: 769–771).

There is, as Johanna Oksala (2012) writes in her recent book on Foucault and violence, often a conflation of ontological or “symbolic” violence and physical violence. She argues that even if we embrace the coding of knowledge and representation of the world in terms of violence and imposition—due to a fundamental disharmony between knowledge and being—this does not necessarily lead to the embrace of the ineradicability of physical violence. She writes that “the investigation of the constitutive role of physical violence must be thoroughly historical and must not rely on any ontologized notion of originary violence as such,” thus seeking to sever the link between the two (Oksala, 2012: 37). But if we accept violence as ontologically inscribed, we might also expect physical violence to follow suit, and the distinction becomes merely one of quantity rather than quality. Hanssen (2000) makes this point when she writes,

[g]ranted in Deleuzean style, Foucault adopted a nonphysical conception of force, which referred to a differential process of “evenementality” rather than advocating real, naturalistic combat … the problem still remained that Foucault did glean the differential play of forces and politics of difference from the real bloody tussle of armed struggle. (2000: 137)

Quite clearly, the distinction between ontological and physical violence cannot be so easily upheld. In the genealogical Foucault, the basic problem is his insistence on the tendency of wills to power always to turn into relations of violent domination.

Genealogy and the hermeneutics of baseless suspicion

How may we then understand the suspicion to anything common, shared, and universal that genealogy is closely linked to and that we find in IR scholarship informed by genealogy? To be able to assume a critical distance from genealogy as a form of critique, it is important to realize that the genealogical ontology of violence is but one option, no more and no less grounded than ontologies which refuse violence as foundational. In this penultimate section, I unravel the Nietzschean backdrop to Foucault’s genealogy and briefly contrast the genealogical ontology of violence with one which refuses violence as foundational by turning to the work of John Milbank.

Paul Ricoeur (1970) once referred to Marx, Nietzsche, and Freud as the “masters of suspicion.” Instead of taking surface phenomena such as discourse, culture, or subjective experience at face value, the “masters of suspicion” sought an underlying phenomenon which would in turn situate and explain this discourse, culture, or experience. For Marx, the ideas, values, and culture of a society would of course ultimately be “conditioned” by the economic base, and at the end of the day shown to be working toward perpetuating the interests of a particular class. For Freud, various types of behavioral neurosis could be explained by reference to an underlying repressed unconscious, which the psychoanalyst would help “bring to the surface,” and make the patient aware of, in the process of psychoanalysis. Nietzsche, however, became for Foucault in his genealogical phase, as Milbank (2006) puts it, “the only true master of suspicion” (2006: 278). Nietzsche’s suspicion, which Foucault takes over and expands on, lies in that all truth claims can be unmasked and exposed as nothing but manifestations of underlying wills to power. Foucault rejects the metaphoric of surface/depth, since the clash of wills to power goes on in the everyday activities of life. There is no deep structure “beyond” or “behind” this clash. However, in another sense, there is still a surface/depth binary at work, which harks back to Foucault’s Nietzschean understanding of a primordial clash in the “non-place” of emergence of forces. As Foucault puts it in a Zarathustra-like pronouncement, commenting on his affinities with the other French neo-Nietzscheans Deleuze, Lyotard, and Guattari, “I would say that we try to bring to light what has remained until now the most hidden, the most occulted, the most deeply invested experience in the history of our culture—power relations.” The “hidden truth” which Foucault (2003 [1973]) wants to “bring to light” is precisely that power relations “permeate the whole fabric of our existence” (2003 [1973]: 17).

The genealogist thus cultivates a particular interpretive disposition to the world, well summed up by Dreyfus and Rabinow (1983):

[h]aving destroyed ideal significations and original truths, [the genealogist] looks for the play of wills. Subjection, domination, and combat are found everywhere he looks. Whenever he hears talk of meaning and value, of virtue and goodness, he looks for strategies of domination. (1983: 109)

“The political question,” as Foucault (2003 [1973]) puts it, before asserting “the importance of Nietzsche,” is not about “error, illusion, alienated consciousness, or ideology; it is truth itself” (2003 [1973]: 75). But a number of problems with this view of politics as conflict always tending to violence and domination as foundational to the human condition immediately present themselves. When all gestures to what is common have been exposed as expressions of partial wills to power, and when the ethos of baseless suspicion has been unleashed and revealed all ideals, values, laws, and norms, as partial and biased, does that mean that human life has become more truthful, as arriving at the realization of the “reality” of this ontologized state of primordial clashes? On Foucault’s own ontology, “Nietzsche’s hypothesis” would itself have to be unmasked as yet another contender among many to capture the final truth about the human condition, and shown to mask a partial will to power (Milbank, 2006: 282; Oksala, 2012: 27). If one deploys the genealogical suspicion onto the genealogical disposition itself, it is revealed as but one option among others.

Reading the genealogical ethos as expressing a distinctive (anti)theological core, one may, with Milbank (2006), ask whether the Nietzschean suspicion that Foucault takes over “is the final and truly non-metaphysical mode of secular reason, or else itself embodies an ontology of power and conflict which is simply another mythos” (2006: 2). One may also follow Milbank in his suggestion that secular discourse of which he reads post-Nietzschean genealogy as a radical exponent of emerged out of an active rejection of some of Christianity’s core teachings. Foucault (2003 [1975–1976]) articulates this rejection when he refers to genealogy as

the very opposite of those traditional analyses that try to find beneath the apparent or superficial confusion, beneath the visible brutality and passions, a basic rationality which is both permanent and related, by its very essence, to the just and the good. (2003 [1975–1976]: 269)

However, in classical Thomist Christianity, difference does not have to be suppressed, reduced, or subsumed in any kind of dialectical movement. Thus, in contrast to Foucault’s genealogy, “[p]eace no longer depends upon the reduction to the self-identical, but is the sociality of harmonious difference. Violence, by contrast, is always a secondary willed intrusion upon this possible infinite order” (Milbank, 2006: 6).

Once one realizes that the ontology of violence is no more than one possible mythos, one can put forward “an alternative mythos, equally unfounded, but nonetheless embodying an ‘ontology of peace’, which conceives differences as analogically related, rather than equivocally at variance” (Milbank, 2006: 279). On the one hand, the reading that Milbank proposes affirms what we find in genealogy, namely “the reduction of substance to transition.” On the other hand, such a reading “questions the transcendental reading of transition as conflict” (Milbank, 2006: 298). So while Milbank retains a differential ontology, he questions whether the elements would have to relate to one another arbitrarily and violently. Milbank puts the crux of the issue thus,

The question of the possibility of living together in mutual agreement, and the question of whether there can be a charitable act, […] turn out to be conjointly the question of whether there can be an “analogy” or a “common measure” between differences which does not reduce differences to mere instances of a common essence or genus. In other words a likeness that only maintains itself through the differences, and not despite nor in addition to them. (Milbank, 2006: 290)

The point is not necessarily that IR scholarship should embrace Milbank’s alternative vision, but rather to make clear that the genealogical rendition is but one option, no more and no less grounded than ontologies which refuse violence as foundational.

Conclusion

This article has examined genealogy as a form of critique in IR. The first part of the article demonstrated that Foucault’s genealogy was an important component in the work of the first generation of post-structuralist IR as well as in contemporary scholarship informed by frameworks of governmentality and biopolitics. It was shown that when genealogy is understood as critique, violence risks being inscribed as foundational to global political life. However, despite the fact that it is virtually impossible to understand the meaning of “critical” in this work without a grasp of genealogy, the assumptions of genealogy have been insufficiently engaged. To rectify this, the second part of the article critically examined the philosophical underpinnings of genealogy. Through a close reading of three core texts where Foucault grapples with genealogy, it was shown that genealogy relies on an ontology of forces, which are postulated as arbitrarily and violently related. Genealogy therefore tends to inscribe violence as foundational to social relations. It was further noted that genealogically informed critique brings a peculiar form of suspicion to all that is presented as common, shared, and universal. This suspicion was traced back to Nietzsche and characterized as “baseless,” which again reflects a set of particular ontological commitments idiosyncratic to genealogy. These commitments, which inscribe violence as foundational, were finally contrasted to an ontology which follows the genealogical understanding of emergent forces, but refuses the assumption of them as arbitrarily and violently related.

Finally, what are the implications for empirical Foucauldian work for the argument I have pursued in the article? In empirical work informed by governmentality and biopolitics, IR scholars often examine the encounter between Western and non-Western countries. The problem to which I ultimately want to draw attention is not that such scholarship is often critical of military intervention undertaken by Western powers. On the contrary, it is important to bring out and critically scrutinize the paternalistic and indeed hierarchical renditions that no doubt are common in, for instance, the liberal peace project (e.g. Richmond, 2011). The problem is rather that the genealogical ethos risks turning into a global interpretive disposition, with which all global interactions by whatever means are made a priori suspect. Instead of seeking to engage in a careful empirical consideration of the merits of forms of intervention in each case, the generalized genealogical suspicion disables any other understanding of global political life than a ceaseless unfolding drama of clashing wills to dominate and conquer. Since the liberal project is exposed as just a particular will to power, it must inscribe a relation of violent hierarchy to non-Western localities, as opposed to an understanding of similar and harmoniously overlapping subjectivities already existing in those places. On such a pre-methodological genealogical disposition, intervention becomes suspicious in whatever form it may take. Whether it is in the form of peacekeeping troops or rule of law advisors assisting local actors in security sector reform, any involvement can only be read as a manifestation of “the West’s” ongoing will to colonize and impose its will on others.

The genealogical disposition easily lends itself to an assertion of incommensurability, more often than not coded in terms of “culture,” since the clashing wills to power in Foucault’s ontology of emergence do not belong to a common space; they have nothing in common. What is made suspect to the extent of disabled is genuine social learning through communication, which presupposes that different sociocultural settings may display profound similarities of aspirations of what is desired. For instance, holding out the possibility that whatever goes under the label of human rights, and especially its minimalist rendition of what human means, is compatible with a range of walks and ways, may harmoniously blend with, and may resonate with many traditions around the world is perhaps the ultimate hope on which the liberal peace project rests (e.g. Moyn, 2010). This hope, however, is disabled by a peculiar form of genealogical faith which lures the researcher to interpret all human interaction as disguising a ceaseless and primordial clash of wills to power.

Following the argument pursued in this article, one needs to realize that the genealogical disposition is reflective of certain ontological assumptions which are but one option. Empirical work in IR informed by governmentality frameworks is no doubt valuable in that such work opens up for a much more extensive power analysis than approaches that reify state actors as the only relevant actors in global politics. Moreover, Foucault’s writings on biopolitics have served as a starting point for examining what happens when life rather than territory become the object of rule, thus broadening the traditional focus in IR to include geopolitics and biopolitics (e.g. Vaughan-Williams, 2015). However, when conducting empirical work in such traditions, it is important to refrain from reading an ontology of violence into the empirical analyses, or at the very least, reflect on the ethico-political stakes involved in doing so.

### XT---No Intervention---1AR

#### Biopolitical discourse doesn’t cause intervention.

David Chandler 10. Professor of International Relations, Department of Politics and International Relations, University of Westminster, London. “The uncritical critique of ‘liberal peace’”. Review of International Studies (2010), 36, 137–155. 2010. British International Studies Association. http://www.davidchandler.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/RIS-Critiques-of-Liberal-Peace.pdf

This article seeks to forward an alternative framework and to question the use of the ‘liberal peace’ rubric to describe and analyse post-conflict and international statebuilding interventions in the post-Cold War period. It will be argued that the critique of liberal peace bears much less relation to policy practice than might be assumed by the critical (radical and policy) discourses and, in fact, appears to inverse the relationship between the critique of the liberal peace and the dominant policy assumptions. The shared desire to critique the liberal peace leads to a set of assumptions and one-sided representations that portray Western policy interventions as too liberal: too fixated on Western models and too keen to allow democratic freedoms and market autonomy. It will be explained here that this view of ‘liberal’ interventions transforming post-conflict societies through ‘immediate’ liberalisation and ‘rapid democratization and marketization’ is a self-serving and fictional policy narrative.5 This narrative fiction is then used, in the frameworks of policy orientated critiques, as the basis upon which to reflect upon Western policy and to limit policy expectations (while often extending regulatory controls) on the basis that the aspirations of external interveners were too ambitious, too interventionist, and too ‘liberal’ for the states and societies which were the subject of intervention.

It is unfortunate that this policy narrative can appear to be given support by more radical critiques of post-Cold War intervention, similarly framed through the critique of liberal peace. For example, Oliver Richmond is not exceptional in re-reading the catastrophe of the invasion and occupation of Iraq in terms of an ‘attempt to mimic the liberal state’, which has ‘done much to discredit the universal claims of the transferability of the liberal peace in political terms’.6 Michael Barnett argues that ‘liberal values’ clearly guide peacebuilding activities and that their ‘explicit goal’ is ‘to create a state defined by the rule of law, markets and democracy’.7 Beate Jahn has argued that ‘the tragedy of liberal diplomacy’ lies in the ideological drive of liberalism, in which intervention is intensified despite the counterproductive results.8 Foucaultian-inspired theorists, Michael Dillon and Julian Reid, similarly reinforce the claims that the key problematic of intervention is its liberal nature in their assertion that we are witnessing a liberal drive to control and to regulate the post-colonial world on the behalf of neo-liberal or biopolitical power, seeking ‘to globalize the domesticating power of civil society mechanisms in a war against all other modes of cultural forms’.9

This view of a transformative drive to regulate and control the post-colonial world on the basis of the liberal framings of power and knowledge stands in stark contrast to the policy world, in which, by the end of the Cold War, leading policy institutions were already highly pessimistic of the capacities of non-liberal subjects to cope with liberal political, economic and social forms and suspicious of even East and Central European states coping with democracy and the market, let alone those of sub-Saharan Africa. Bringing the critique back in relation with the policy practices seems to suggest that the policy critics of the liberal peace offer succour and consolation to the policymakers rather than critique. This leads to the concern of this article that more radical critiques of the liberal peace may need to ensure that they are not drawn into a framework in which their critical intentions may be blunted.

There are many different approaches taken to the critique of liberal peace approaches and often authors do not clearly stake out their methodological frameworks or develop a ‘scattergun approach’ using a range of different critiques.10 Nevertheless, for heuristic purposes, it will be useful to frame these diverse critiques within two broad, distinctive, but often interconnected, approaches; which are here categorised as the radical, ‘power-based’, and the more policy orientated, ‘ideas-based’, critiques. The former approach tends to see the discourse of liberal peace as an ideological and instrumental one, arguing that the rhetoric of freedom, markets and democracy is merely a representation of Western self-interest, which has little genuine concern for the security and freedoms of those societies intervened in. The latter approach suggests that rather than the concepts being misused, in the discursive frameworks of the projection of Western power, the problem lies less with power relations than with the universal conceptualising of the liberal peace itself.

### AT: Threat Con---2AC

#### Global disasters exist and must be addressed---refusing threat construction makes it impossible to address insecurity.

Aaron L. Friedberg 01. Professor of Politics and International Affairs, Woodrow Wilson School, Princeton University, Commentary, Vol. 111, No. 2, February 2001, p. https://lists.lsit.ucsb.edu/archives/gordon-newspost/2001-May/001274.html

Is it possible, finally, that merely by talking and perhaps even by thinking about a full-blown Sino-American rivalry we may increase the probability of its actually coming to pass? This is the clear implication of Michael Swaine ’s letter. Mr. Swaine worries that “ordinary observers,” unable to distinguish between descriptions of present reality and “hair-raising scenarios” of the future, will conclude that “an intense geostrategic rivalry is virtually inevitable, and . . . respond accordingly.” While I am flattered by the thought that my article could somehow change the course of history, I very much doubt that it, or a hundred more like it, will have any such effect. On the other hand, I am disturbed by the suggestion that we ought to avoid discussing unpleasant possibilities for fear that someone (presumably our political representatives and “ordinary” fellow citizens) might get the wrong idea. Acknowledging real dangers is a necessary first step to avoiding them, as well as to preparing to cope with them if they should nevertheless come to pass. Refusing or neglecting to do so, it seems to me, is a far more likely formula for disaster.

### AT: Surveillance Impact---2AC

#### Surveillance, bureaucracy, and scientific modernity are necessary to prevent violence---their impacts oversimplify history.

Ken Booth 07.IR @ Aberystwyth *Theory of World Security* p. 132-133

Daryl Glaser. a scholar from South Africa, and therefore somebody directly familiar with life in a state that was once committed to institutionalised racism, has offered an important counter to the Bauman thesis and the simplistic interhnkinil by postmodern writers of the Holocaust and modernimJ°" In a book written a decade after Mandela's release, Glaser argued that it was not the surveillance, statistics, and regulation that were the aspects of Nazi behaviour demanding attention. Nor was it the 'lawfulness, planning, bureaucratic regulation or the professionalisation of knowledge' that fed into Nazi racial policies. That is, Glaser claimed that the features of modernity showcased by the Bauman thesis were not what demanded attention; rather, it was the 'institutionalisation of a racial hierarchy of wealth, status and power, enforced by repressive, often arbitrary state authority, assisted by bad laws'. What was wrong in Nazi Germany (and in apartheid South Africa) was not 'modernity', but laws and politics that served ideas of racial superiority - a prejudice that was directly contrary to 'modern ideals like social justice'. Modernity for Glaser delivered ideas of social justice to South Africa, while its modalities in the form of statistics and regulation, and so on constituted the very means by which illiteracy could be overcome, and the health of the disadvantaged improved.

Rejecting the logic and political implications of the Bauman thesis, Glaser advocated 'more and better law, effectively enforced, and more "scientific" information about the condition of the people, not less of these "modern" goods'. His view was that the people(s) of post- apartheid South Africa were in a better position than in the recent past albeit still a perilous one, because the oppressed had identified with modernity's ideas of tolerance and equality, and had found solidarity in the global human rights supporters. Social development (improved literacy and better health), he stressed, requires planning, profession- alised knowledge, and other modalities of modernity - not their rejection. What Glaser called the 'organisational machinery of "modernity" to give effect to "modern" ideas like social justice' 107 does not guarantee the security and hence prospects for emancipation for South Africa's peoples, but it does give them hope.105

The idea of progress is not what it was, but is more useful as a result. It should never be considered as part of nature's plan for history, or pursued with hubris, but always with reflexivity The ideals of emancipation that inform progressive politics are guides for judgement and action; without them societies will replicate structural and other oppressions, and humanity will never be what it might become.

### XT---Authority Good---1AR

#### Authority is necessary for life and value preservation---their critique is too totalizing.

Anastasia Berg 20. Junior research fellow in philosophy at the University of Cambridge and an editor at The Point. This article is part of The Point’s Quarantine Journal. “Giorgio Agamben’s Coronavirus Cluelessness.” https://www.chronicle.com/article/Giorgio-Agamben-s/248306?key=z5yodZPXH1-Hi8hgwdp9akWH-jXrno6FVQZE24qkIFpuxgIOSVaMjuRtSAg7\_lBhSjNkRkZwNTBOR1RVbUlDYWFwc0VzOU93TXZka2U1QVJRUkFwZGJhdElSbw&cid=wsinglestory\_41\_1&fbclid=IwAR3g67ghodcyGmnV3\_q9OFqTKh83Hvn3DRUL2CuVNHUDBP1QN-L-Oo9yUvM

Like a bemused Fox News anchor, Agamben concludes that travel bans, canceling public and private events, closing public and commercial institutions, and enforcing quarantine and surveillance are all simply "disproportionate": a cost too high to pay to protect oneself from just one more ordinary disease.

In a widely circulated response, the French philosopher Jean-Luc Nancy, who identifies Agamben as an "old friend," takes exception to Agamben’s focus on government as the sole culprit of the crisis, but concedes his general argument about the perils of a perpetual state of panicked existence: "an entire civilization is involved, there is no doubt about it." Yet the most noteworthy part of Nancy’s reply is its closing note: "Almost thirty years ago doctors decided that I needed a heart transplant. Giorgio was one of the very few who advised me not to listen to them. If I had followed his advice I would have probably died soon enough. It is possible to make a mistake."

Nancy is right: Mistakes can be made. But is Agamben’s dogmatic skepticism toward institutional intervention of all kinds rightly classified as a mistake? Or has an intellectual habit become a pathological compulsion? Either way, Nancy’s small personal anecdote reveals just what is at stake in Agamben’s polemical pose, applied to the real world: the life of loved ones, especially the old and vulnerable.

Not that Agamben would allow his old friend’s words, not to mention the devastation that has continued ravaging Italy, to rattle his confidence. The deaths of hundreds of Italians per day seems only to have hardened his resolve.

In his second piece, titled simply "Clarifications," Agamben graciously concedes that an epidemic is upon us, leaving behind the misleading empirical claims. (Well, almost, and the exception is worth noting: Agamben claims that "There have been more serious epidemics in the past, but no one ever thought for that reason to declare a state of emergency like the current one, which prevents us even from moving." This is false. As Agamben’s intellectual godfather Michel Foucault details in Discipline and Punish, as early as the 1600s, preparations for the plague included the complete restriction of movement between and within towns in Europe: "Each individual is ﬁxed in his place. And, if he moves, he does so at the risk of his life, contagion or punishment.") For the most part, Agamben focuses his clarification on another, principled objection to the draconian measures implemented across the world: How much sacrifice is too much?

Agamben correctly observes that the question of the proportionality of the response is not a scientific one; it is moral. And the answer is not obvious. Here, at least, Agamben arrives at a serious question. This is exactly the kind of question we had hoped the humanist could help us answer.

Agamben’s way of addressing it is framed by a distinction between "bare life" — our biological survival — and something he holds in higher regard; call it social or ethical life. "The first thing that the wave of panic that has paralyzed the country obviously shows is that our society no longer believes in anything but bare life," he observes. In our hysterical panic, exerting herculean efforts to avoid physical harm, we have made ourselves vulnerable to loss of a far higher order: sacrificing our work, friendships, extended families, religious rites (first among them, funerals), and political commitments. In this way, we might preserve ourselves biologically, but we will have eliminated in the process anything that gives life meaning, that makes it worth living.

What is more, the exclusive focus on survival at any cost, on the preservation of "bare life," not only constitutes a spiritual defeat in its own right, but turns us against one another, threatening the possibility of meaningful human relationships and thus any semblance of "society": "Bare life — and the danger of losing it — is not something that unites people, but blinds and separates them." Paranoia drives us to view other human beings "solely as possible spreaders of the plague," to be avoided at all costs. Such a state, where we all dedicate ourselves to a battle against an enemy within us, lurking in every other person, is "in reality, a civil war." The consequences, Agamben predicts, will be grim and will outlast the epidemic. He concludes:

Just as wars have left as a legacy to peace a series of inauspicious technology, from barbed wire to nuclear power plants, so it is also very likely that one will seek to continue even after the health emergency experiments that governments did not manage to bring to reality before: closing universities and schools and doing lessons only online, putting a stop once and for all to meeting together and speaking for political or cultural reasons and exchanging only digital messages with each other, wherever possible substituting machines for every contact — every contagion — between human beings.

To be clear, Agamben is right that the costs we are paying are exceedingly high: The response to the epidemic exacts great sacrifices from us as individuals and from society as a whole. Moreover — and putting to one side the conspiratorial paranoia — there is a real risk that the virus will lower public resistance to political measures that threaten democratic self-governance: increased use of surveillance, the expansion of executive powers, and restrictions on the freedom of movement and association.

Observing potential costs, however, is the easy part. What is much more difficult and much more perilous is getting clear on what it is exactly that we are sacrificing for. Agamben is right that a life dedicated solely to our own biological survival is a human life in name only, and that to voluntarily choose such a life is not merely a personal sacrifice but a form of societywide moral self-harm. But is this really what we are doing?

There are of course those who refuse to bow to the recommendations of the authorities — the Florida spring breakers, the St. Paddy’s Day pub crawlers. Are these the moral heroes Agamben is calling for? In the meantime, those of us who have, with heavy hearts, embraced the restrictions on our freedoms, are not merely aiming at our own biological survival. We have welcomed the various institutional limitations on our lives (in fact sometimes hoped our governments would introduce these sooner), and we have urged our friends and family (especially our stubborn parents!) to do the same, not to ward off "the danger of getting sick," not for the sake of our bare life, and indeed not for the sake of the bare life of others, but out of an ethical imperative: to exercise the tremendous powers of society to protect the vulnerable, be they our loved ones or someone else’s.

We are doing all of this, in the first place, for our fellow people — our parents, our grandparents, and all those who are, by dint of fate, fragile. Nothing could be further from our minds than the maintenance of their "bare life": We care about these people because they are our kin, our friends, and the members of our community.

My fiancé and I canceled our summer wedding last week. We did it so that our guests, including my partner’s high-risk father, might be able at some later date to safely attend the social celebration of our decision to tie our lives to one another’s. We are now cooped up in our apartment, "isolating," so that we may be able to visit his father, later, without endangering his health, if we ever make it back to London. With any luck, we may all get to celebrate that wedding together one day after all. With any luck, our children will one day meet their grandfather. Agamben laments that we are sacrificing "social relationships, work, even friendships, affections, and religious and political convictions" to "the danger of getting sick." But we are not making sacrifices for the sake of anyone’s mere survival. We sacrifice because sharing our joys and pains, efforts and leisure, with our loved ones — young and old, sick and healthy — is the very substance of these so-called "normal conditions of life."

"What is a society," Agamben asks, "that has no value other than survival?" Under certain circumstances, this is a good question; under these circumstances, it is a blind one. Is this the society Agamben believes he is living in? When this philosopher looks around him, does he truly see nothing but the fight for "bare life"? If so, Agamben’s "clarification" may be revealing in a way he hadn’t intended. We might think of it as a very lucid example of "bare theory": the dressing up of outdated jargon as a form of courageous resistance to unreflecting moral dogma. Sometimes it is advisable to hold off on deploying the heavy theoretical machinery until one has looked around. If we are after wisdom about how to live today, we should look elsewhere.

#### Democratic biopolitics good---key to prevent death and suffering.

Panagiotis Sotiris 20. Adjunct lecturer at the University of Crete, Panteion University, the University of the Aegean, and the University of Athens. His research interests include Marxist philosophy, the work of Louis Althusser, and social and political movements in Greece. Against Agamben: Is a Democratic Biopolitics Possible? https://www.viewpointmag.com/2020/03/20/against-agamben-democratic-biopolitics/

Moreover, it is obvious that simply treating measures of public health, such as quarantines or ‘social distancing’, as biopolitics somehow misses their potential usefulness. In the absence of a vaccine or successful anti-viral treatments, these measures, coming from the repertoire of 19th century public health manuals, can reduce the burden, especially for vulnerable groups.

This is especially urgent if we recognize that even in advanced capitalist economies public health infrastructure has deteriorated and cannot actually stand the peak of the pandemic, unless measures to reduce the rate of its expansion are taken.

One might say that contra Agamben, the concept of ‘naked life’ can better describe the pensioner on a waiting list for a respirator or an ICU bed, because of a collapsed public health system, than the attempt to adjust to the practical exigencies of social distancing or quarantine measures. In light of the above I would like to suggest a different return to Foucault. I think that sometimes we forget that Foucault had a highly relational conception of power practices.4 In this sense, it is legitimate to ask whether a democratic or even communist biopolitics is possible.

To put this question in a different way: Is it possible to have collective practices that actually help the health of populations, including large-scale behaviour modifications, without a parallel expansion of forms of coercion and surveillance?

Foucault himself, in his late work, points towards such a direction, around the notions of truth, parrhesia and care of the self.5 In this highly original dialogue with ancient philosophy, in particular Hellenistic and Roman, he suggested an alternative politics of bios that combines individual and collective care, based on a certain obligation and courage to tell the truth, in non-coercive ways.

In such a perspective, the decisions for the reduction of movement and for social distancing in times of epidemics, or for not smoking in closed public spaces, or for avoiding individual and collective practices that harm the environment, would be the result of democratically discussed collective decisions based on the knowledge available and as part of a collective effort to care for others and ourselves. This means that from simple discipline we move to responsibility, in regards to others and then ourselves, and from suspending sociality to consciously transforming it. In such a condition, instead of a permanent individualized fear, which can break down any sense of social cohesion, we move towards the idea of collective effort, coordination and solidarity within a common struggle, elements that in such health emergencies can be equally important to medical interventions.

This offers the possibility of a democratic biopolitics. This can also be based on the democratization of knowledge. The increased access to knowledge, along with the need for popularization campaigns makes possible collective decision processes that are based on knowledge and understanding and not just the authority of experts.

Biopolitics from below

The battle against HIV, the fight of stigma, the attempt to make people understand that it is not the disease of ‘high risk groups’, the demand for education on safe sex practices, the funding of the development of therapeutic measures and the access to public health services, would not have been possible without the struggle of movements such as ACT UP. One might say that this was indeed an example of a biopolitics from below.

And in the current conjuncture, social movements have a lot of room to act. They can ask of immediate measures to help public health systems withstand the extra burden caused by the pandemic. They can point to the need for solidarity and collective self-organization during such a crisis, in contrast to individualized “survivalist” panics. They can insist on state power (and coercion) being used to channel resources from the private sector to socially necessary directions. They can organize struggles for paid sick leave and for an end to measures such as eviction. They can put their collective ingenuity in practice to create forms of support for the elderly and those without any assistance. They can project, in all possible ways, the fact that today the struggle against the pandemic is a struggle waged by labour, not capital, by doctors and nurses in understaffed public health systems, by precarious workers in the vital supply chains, by those that keep basics infrastructure running during the lock-down. And they can demand social change as a life-saving exigency.

### AT: Critique Alt---2AC

#### The alternative fails---critique and negation don’t provide a political playbooks.

Kathryn Sikkink 08. Professor of Political Science at the University of Minnesota. “The Role of Consequences, Comparison, and Counterfactuals in Constructivist Ethical Thought” 2008 http://www.polisci.umn.edu/centers/theory/pdf/sikkink.pdf

Ethical arguments of these different types are ubiquitous and necessary. But because they are also slippery and open to manipulation and misuse, we also need to be very careful and precise about how we go about using them. I would recommend that first we distinguish very carefully between the comparison to ideals and historical empirical comparison. I believe that many critical constructivist accounts rely on the comparison to the ideal or to the conditions of possibility counterfactual argument. In almost every critical constructivist work there is an implicit ideal ethical argument. This argument is implicit because it is rarely clearly stated, but it is found in the nature of the 36 critique. So, for example, in her discussion of U.S. human rights policy, Roxanne Doty critiques a human rights policy carried out by actors who sometimes use it for their own self aggrandizement and to denigrate others. 42 The implicit ideal this presents is a human rights policy that is not used for denigration or surveillance or othering those it criticizes or conversely, of elevating those who advocate it. What would be examples of such a policy? The book does not provide examples. We do not know if examples exist in the world. So the implicit comparison is a comparison to an ideal – a never fully stated ideal, but one present in the critique of what is wrong with the policies discussed. Nicolas Guilhot makes a similar argument in his recent book. The promotion of democracy and human rights, he argues, are increasingly used in order to extend the power they were meant to limit. “The promotion of democracy and human rights defines new forms of administration on a global scale and generates a new political science.” He historically examines how progressive movements for democracy and human rights have become hegemonic because they “systematically managed to integrate emancipatory and progressive forces in the construction of imperial policies.” But once again, the book offers no alternative political scenario. In the final sentence of the book, the author clarifies that “this book has no other ambition than to contribute to the democratic critique of democracy.” 43 In the introduction, he clarifies, “This book does not provide answers to these dilemmas. At most, its only ambition is to highlight them, in the hope that a proper understanding constitutes a first step toward the invention of new courses of action.”44 Ethically, I believe this is a cop-out. Politically and intellectually, I find it too comfortable and too easy. This critique has a crucial role to play in pointing to hypocrisy (as Price highlights in the introduction). It could also serve as a catalyst for policy change in the direction of policy that would include less surveillance or less cooptation of human rights discourse. But it is unlikely to serve as a catalyst for new action or policy change unless it ventures something more than pure critique, unless it risks a political or ethical proposal. Without that, it has the impact of delegitimizing any human rights policy without suggesting any alternative. Any policy to promote human rights of democracy policy is shown to be deeply flawed or even pernicious. It is portrayed as part of the problem, certainly not as offering any kind of solution. Human rights policy appears to make the situation worse, not better. The critique has the effect of telling us clearly what we do not want, what we can not support—human rights policies by imperfect and hypocritical actors like the U.S. In its historical comparisons, it also lumps human rights policy together with colonialism and does not provide any elements to distinguish between one policy of surveillance and other. All are equally flawed. The ethical effect is to remove normative support from existing policies without producing any alternatives. This is similar to what Price means when he says that “critical accounts which do not in fact offer constructive normative theorizing to follow critique ironically lend themselves to being complicit with the conservative agenda opposing erstwhile progressive change in world politics.” Neither Doty nor Guilhot, for example, contrast two human rights policies to give examples of policies that are more of less hypocritical or where there has been more or 44 Guilhot, p. 14. 38 less surveillance. They don’t contrast human rights policies or democracy promotion policies to previous policies that were also hypocritical and self aggrandizing, but more pernicious – e.g. national security ideology and support for authoritarian regimes in the third world. By presenting no contrasts, the critique would appear to say that there is no ethical or political difference between a policy that supports coups and funds repressive military regimes and a policy that critiques coups and cuts military aid to repressive regimes. These policies would appear to be ethically indistinguishable. Indeed, by these standards, a realist policy (a la Kissinger) might be preferable. Kissinger didn’t denigrate his authoritarianism allies. He took regimes as they were. He treated them as valuable allies. He didn’t lecture them on how they should change. He also, in doing so, encouraged, in some cases, coups and mass murder. But at least he didn’t “Other”. Doty and Guilhot give me no ethical criteria to distinguish between the policies of the Kissinger administration, the Carter administration, and current Bush administration policy. Because the comparison is an implicit ideal, never an empirical real world example, the critique is very telling and can delegitimize the critiqued policy. But nothing is put in its place. So, it demobilizes any support we might have for any human rights policy. It puts the analyst in an ethically comfortable position, but by not proposing any explicit comparison, it demobilizes the reader. We learn what to oppose, to critique, but we don’t learn explicitly what to support in its stead. The result can be political paralysis.One finds it difficult to act.

### AT: Antiwar Movement Alt---2AC

#### Antiwar movements fail.

James Jay Carafano 08. Senior research fellow for national security at The Heritage Foundation. "The Wilting Anti-War Movement". Heritage Foundation. 7-22-2008. https://www.heritage.org/defense/commentary/the-wilting-anti-war-movement

One thing's certain: The anti-war movement in the United States won't drive foreign policy. Indeed, such factions never do.

Anti-war movements are a fixture of American culture dating back to the Revolution. Americans argue about their wars before, during and after. That's an inherent feature of how democracies go to war. Nevertheless, the role of dissenters in shaping American attitudes is particularly overblown. Americans like to make up their own minds.

Anti-war movements don't drive public will. They ride the crest of the public opinion wave. For example, there was a vocal and well-organized movement to keep America out of World War II. It was led by aviator Charles Lindberg, an all-American hero, and Gerald Nye, the irrepressible populist senator from North Dakota. Their following collapsed after Pearl Harbor.

Today's anti-war movement didn't so much shape public opinion as feed off it. Americans had been frustrated by the lack of progress in stabilizing Iraq after the conflict and the death spiral of violence dragging the country into civil war. But contrary to what anti-war activists fervently claimed, that angst wasn't the result of Americans' feeling repelled by a long war or by causalities.

Americans are averse to failure, sending their sons and daughters and national treasure into harm's way when there seems no purpose. Americans can accept sacrifice as long as they believe that the cause serves their national interest and that the goal is attainable.

A new U.S. strategy in Iraq has stemmed violence, put Al Qaeda on its heels, frustrated Iran's hope to dominate the country and renewed hopes for establishing a stable state. Indeed, for many Americans, the ferocity with which Al Qaeda and Iran have tried to exploit conditions in Iraq is a grim reminder of how dangerous America's enemies really are.

In turn, Americans have become more sanguine about meeting our responsibilities in Iraq, even though it appears the effort will take years and all the troops won't be coming home soon. The anti-war movement is continuing the charge, but most Americans aren't following.

Nor do the anti-war movements share any political coherence. All they have in common is opposition to the war. When that cause goes away, the movement will fall apart. This is already happening with the anti-Iraq war movement.

It's ironic to watch the veterans against the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan trying to mimic the Vietnam era "Winter Soldier" project by allegedly documenting widespread atrocities by U.S. military forces.

The Vietnam project produced sensational, but highly dubious, results. America's Army was never the "barbarian horde" that young John Kerry famously claimed it was. Likewise, virtually every one of today's men and women in uniform serve honorably, as well. Most Americans believe in their soldiers, so a new "Winter Soldier" project will only further distance the movement from mainstream politics.

The Constitution designed a government that insulates the president from such political factions. A newly elected president has a mandate from the American people and usually is able to rise above the demands of divisive groups.

Only one American president, Gerald Ford, was ever forced to quit a war. He is the exception that proves the rule. Congress voted to cut funds supporting South Vietnam even though by 1975 our country had largely put the war behind it. The problem was Ford was an unelected president with no support from either the left or the right.

In contrast, the next president will have more than enough political will to push back against a now wilting anti-war movement. The winner will, however, have to put America's interests first and have the courage to deal with the realities of international affairs rather than the whims of political factions here at home - no matter what he has promised.

### AT: Russian Antiwar Movement Alt---2AC/1AR

#### The Russian “antiwar” movement is a joke---the alt cedes power to Russian expansion.

Volodymyr Vakhitov and Natalia Zaika 4/27/22. Volodymyr Vakhitov is an assistant professor at the Kyiv School of Economics and head of BeSmart, the Center for Behavioral Studies and Communications. Natalia Zaika is a researcher at BeSmart, the Center for Behavioral Studies and Communications. "Beyond Putin: Russian imperialism is the No. 1 threat to global security". Atlantic Council. 4-27-2022. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/beyond-putin-russian-imperialism-is-the-no-1-threat-to-global-security/

While politicians and commentators in the West continue to promote the comforting notion that Russians are themselves victims of Putin’s regime, virtually all the available evidence points to strong Russian public support for the war in Ukraine. A recent survey conducted by Russia’s only internationally respected independent pollster, the Levada Center, found that 81% of Russians back the invasion of Ukraine with just 14% opposed. Another recent Levada Center poll identified a 12% surge in Vladimir Putin’s approval rating since the beginning of the war. These results have been mirrored in numerous other polls and surveys.

Meanwhile, the anti-war movement inside Russia remains underwhelming. There have been some public protests in major Russian cities, but these rallies have failed to attract significant numbers and been easily contained by the authorities. Rather than engaging in anti-war activism, most of the Russians who claim to oppose the regime have stayed silent or chosen exile and voluntarily left the country.

Positive Russian attitudes toward the war are rooted in longstanding perceptions of Ukraine as part of Russia’s imperial heartlands. Despite the passage of three decades since the collapse of the Soviet Union, many Russians have never fully come to terms with the idea of an independent Ukraine and continue to regard the country as an indivisible element of historic Russia that has been artificially separated from the motherland.

Putin did not invent such sentiments but he has proven highly skilled at exploiting them. In his many speeches and essays on the Ukraine issue, he has consistently appealed to Russia’s imperial aspirations while playing on widespread resentment at the country’s post-Soviet humiliations and loss of superpower status. When Putin laments the fall of the USSR as the “demise of historical Russia,” ordinary Russians understand that it is primarily Ukraine he has in mind.

The Russian leader’s refusal to recognize Ukrainian statehood is not only a rejection of the post-1991 settlement. It is entirely in line with traditional Russian thinking and echoes key tenets of Czarist imperial doctrine dating back centuries. Putin routinely denies Ukraine’s right to exist and has frequently accused modern Ukraine of occupying historically Russian lands while dismissing Ukraine’s entire centuries-long statehood struggle as a Western ploy to destabilize Russia. On the eve of the invasion, he called Ukraine “an inalienable part of our own history, culture and spiritual space.”

Putin is particularly fond of declaring that Russians and Ukrainians are “one people.” This insistence that Ukrainians and Russians are part of the same whole has long been a central theme of Russian imperial propaganda toward Ukraine and provides the ideological basis for the current war. By positioning Ukraine as rightfully Russian, it reframes the unprovoked invasion of a peaceful neighbor as a justified response to a grave historical injustice.

In recent months, the Russian ruler has gone even further. He has branded modern Ukraine an “anti-Russia” that can no longer be tolerated while claiming the country has been taken over by the West. This resonates deeply with the Russian public, which has traditionally associated any manifestations of Ukrainian statehood with treachery and extremism.

We are currently witnessing the criminal consequences of these imperial delusions. Russian soldiers who have been encouraged to dismiss Ukrainians as traitors and view Ukraine itself as an anti-Russian invention are now engaging in war crimes that are entirely in keeping with the genocidal tone adopted by Putin and other Kremlin officials. As Voltaire once warned, “Those who can make you believe absurdities can make you commit atrocities.”

On the domestic front, the Kremlin-controlled mainstream media openly discusses the need to destroy Ukraine. For example, an article published by Russian state news agency RIA Novosti on April 3 made clear that Putin’s talk of “de-nazification” is actually code for the “de-Ukrainianization” of Ukraine. This chilling text laid out a detailed plan for the elimination of the Ukrainian nation and was branded a “genocide handbook” by Yale historian Timothy Snyder.

If Russian imperialism is not confronted and defeated in Ukraine, other countries will soon face similar threats. While Ukraine appears to be a particular obsession for both Putin and the wider Russian public, the list of other potential victims is long. The Baltic states and Moldova are among the most likely to become targets of Russian imperial aggression, while the nations of Central Asia are clearly at risk. It is also worth noting that Poland and Finland were once part of the Russian Empire that Putin longs to resurrect.

For almost three decades, Western leaders have approached successive acts of Russian imperial aggression as isolated incidents and have sought to downplay their significance while focusing on the economic advantages of continuing to do business with Moscow. This has only served to encourage the Kremlin. The Chechen wars of the early post-Soviet years were followed by the 2008 invasion of Georgia and the 2014 seizure of Crimea. The current war is the latest milestone in this grim sequence but it will not be the last. Resurgent Russian imperialism now clearly poses the biggest single challenge to global security. Countering this threat must be the international community’s top priority.

### AT: NATO K---2AC/1AR

#### The alt cedes power to Putin---he’s expansionist---turns the K.

Matt Johnson 22. Masters in journalism from the University of Kansas. "Forget NATO: Ukraine's problem is Russian imperialism". Haaretz. 1-30-2022. https://www.haaretz.com/world-news/.premium-forget-nato-ukraine-s-problem-is-russian-imperialism-1.10576686

Don’t blame NATO expansion for this pointless and terrifying crisis. Don’t blame the post-Cold War hubris of the West. Blame Russian imperialism and the monumental sense of historical grievance that animates every decision the Kremlin makes.

Many American academics, pundits, and politicians vehemently disagree with this assessment. Harvard professor Stephen Walt argues that the "great tragedy is this entire affair was avoidable." Avoidable because Putin manufactured a military threat from Ukraine to justify his imperial ambitions? Of course not.

Like so many realist scholars, Walt blames the West: "Had the United States and its European allies not succumbed to hubris, wishful thinking, and liberal idealism and relied instead on realism’s core insights, the present crisis would not have occurred." This has been Walt’s position for years – whether it’s the Russian invasion of Georgia or Crimea or Ukraine itself, the expansion of NATO is always the trigger for Moscow’s aggression. Walt’s fellow realist John Mearsheimer makes the same argument.

But for all its pretensions of hardheadedness, realism fails to account for the most significant determinant of Russia’s behavior over the past two decades: Putin’s imperialism. After the invasion and annexation of Crimea, Putin delivered a speech about the grievous historic injustice of Ukrainian independence.

At the end of the Cold War, he said, "Russia realized that it was not simply robbed, it was plundered." He celebrated the “culture, civilization and human values that unite the peoples of Russia, Ukraine and Belarus." He argued that "Crimea has always been an inseparable part of Russia." He observed that Crimea was originally "transferred within the boundaries of a single state. Back then, it was impossible to imagine that Ukraine and Russia may split up and become two separate states. However, this has happened."

Putin still finds it impossible to imagine that Ukraine is an autonomous state – a democracy, no less, which poses a direct ideological challenge to his own sputtering oligarchy. As he explained to President George W. Bush during a NATO summit in April 2008: "George, you have to understand that Ukraine is not even a country. Part of its territory is in Eastern Europe and the greater part was given to us."

A brief glimpse at the historical record gives the lie to this empty revanchist claim – the Ukrainian parliament supported independence by a vast margin in 1991. In fact, Russia was one of the first states to recognize Ukrainian sovereignty – as the Economist essay notes, Ukrainian independence and cohesion "set a precedent for Russia to define itself the same way, and refuse independence to restive territories such as Chechnya." Granted, Moscow still expected to have strong ties with Ukraine, but Putin’s insistence that it’s "not even a country" is as absurd and ahistorical as it is nakedly self-serving.

It’s possible to read a whole lot of commentary about Russia and Ukraine today without confronting any of this history – or considering the lens through which Putin views that history. The view that NATO expansion was a catastrophic mistake assumes that Russian aggression is a ‘natural’ reaction to the perceived threat of Western encroachment. In other words, massing 100,000 troops on Ukraine’s border is what any great power would do in similar circumstances.

Those who make this argument present NATO expansion as the primary culprit because they evidently haven’t considered the possibility that Putin would have found some other pretext for the expansion of Russia’s sphere of influence at gunpoint. Nor do they seem interested in discussing the likelihood that Putin would have taken advantage of NATO’s absence in Eastern Europe. Nor do they seem to care about the democratic aspirations or self-determination of the countries in the region.

#### NATO is key---Russia left agrees.

Russian Socialist Movement and Ukraine Social Movement 4/7/22. The Russian Socialist Movement is a political organization whose vision of democratic socialism is based on communal ownership of property, political freedom and self-determination. They believe that only a mass movement—of socialists, unions, feminists, antifascists and environmental activists—armed with class-based solidarity and egalitarianism can end the rule of capital in Russia. Sotsialnyi Rukh (Ukr. ‘Social Movement’) is a Ukrainian democratic-socialist left organization that fights against capitalism and xenophobia. Social Movement unites social activists and trade unions in the struggle to build a better world without the dictatorship of capital, patriarchy, and discrimination. "Against Russian Imperialism". Lefteast. 4-7-2022. https://lefteast.org/against-russian-imperialism/

Although the majority of the left has condemned the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the left camp’s unity is still lacking. We would like to address those on the left who still stick to “a plague on both houses” position that views the war as an inter-imperialist war.

It is high time the left woke up and carried out a “concrete analysis of the concrete situation” instead of reproducing worn-out frameworks from the Cold War. Overlooking Russian imperialism is a terrible mistake for the left. It is Putin, not NATO, who is waging war on Ukraine. That is why it is essential to shift our focus from Western imperialism to Putin’s aggressive imperialism, which has an ideological and political basis in addition to an economic one.

Russian imperialism consists of two elements. Firstly, it involves revisionist Russian nationalism. After 2012, Putin and his establishment moved from a civic concept of the nation (as rossiysky, “related to Russia”) to an exclusive, ethnically based concept of Russianness (as russkiy, “ethnically/culturally Russian”). His aggression in 2014 and in 2022 was legitimized by the return of “originally” Russian lands. Moreover, this concept of (ethnic) “Russianness” revives the nineteenth-century imperial concept of the Russian nation, which reduces Ukrainian and Belarusian identity to regional identities. According to this view, Russians, Belarusians, and Ukrainians are a single people. Employing this concept in official rhetoric implies the negation of independent Ukrainian statehood. That is why we cannot say with any degree of certainty that Putin only wants the recognition of Russian sovereignty over Crimea and the Donbas. Putin may desire to either annex or subdue the whole of Ukraine, threats which appear in his article “On the Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians” and in his speech on February 21, 2022. Finally, the perspective of Ukraine-Russia peace talks look rather bleak, as Russia’s negotiation team is headed by former Minister of Culture Vladimir Medinsky, one of the most dedicated believers in the ideology of russkiy mir (the ethnic Russian world) – a world where, believe us, no one will be happy.

Secondly, even though Putin’s aggression is hard to explain rationally, current events have demonstrated that it may be reasonable enough, nevertheless, to take Russian imperialist rhetoric at face value. Russian imperialism is fueled by the desire to change the so-called “world order.” Thus, Putin’s demand for NATO’s withdrawal from Eastern Europe may signal that Russia may not stop with Ukraine, and Poland, Latvia, Lithuania, or Estonia may be the next targets of Putin’s aggression. It is very naïve to demand to demilitarize Eastern Europe, because in the light of current circumstances, that will only be appeasing Putin and will make Eastern European countries vulnerable to Putin’s aggression. Discourse about NATO expansion obscures Putin’s desire to divide the spheres of influence in Europe between the US and Russia. Being in the Russian sphere of influence means a country’s political subordination to Russia and subjection to the expansion of Russian capital. The cases of Georgia and Ukraine demonstrate that Putin is ready to use force to influence the political affairs of countries which he believes wish to leave the Russian sphere of influence. It is important to understand that Putin’s understanding of key agents in the world order is basically limited to the US and China. He does not recognize other countries’ sovereignty, regarding them as satellites of one of these agents of the international order.

Putin and his establishment are very cynical. They use the NATO bombing of Yugoslavia, American intervention in Afghanistan, and the invasion of Iraq as a shield for the bombing of Ukraine. In this context, the left must show consistency and say no to all imperialist aggression in the world. Today the imperialist aggressor is Russia, not NATO, and if Russia is not stopped in Ukraine, it will definitely continue its aggression.

Furthermore, we must have no illusions about Putin’s regime. It offers no alternative to Western capitalism. It is an authoritarian, oligarchic capitalism. The level of inequality in Russia has risen significantly during the 20 years of his leadership. Putin is not only an enemy of the working class, but also an enemy to all forms of democracy. Popular participation in politics and voluntary associations is treated with suspicion in Russia. Putin is essentially an anti-Communist and an enemy to everything the left fought for in the twentieth century and is fighting for in the twenty-first. In his worldview, the strong have a right to beat the weak, the rich have the right to exploit the poor, and strongmen in power have the right to make decisions on behalf of their disempowered population. This worldview must be dealt a severe blow in Ukraine. In order for political change to come about inside of Russia, the Russian army must be defeated in Ukraine.

### AT: Cyber K---Permutation---2AC/1AR

#### Perm do both---de-securitizing cyber threats shouldn’t ignore cyber threats---the alt alone can’t solve the case.

Joe Burton and Clare Lain 20. Joe Burton is a Marie Curie Fellow at Université libre de Bruxelles. Clare Lain joined the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (CCDCOE) in January 2016 as the UK Senior National Representative and was there for four years. "Desecuritising cybersecurity: towards a societal approach". Taylor & Francis. 6-3-2020. https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/23738871.2020.1856903

We have presented the argument that a shift needs to occur in cybersecurity theory and policy. One way of achieving this is through the application of the societal security approach and its adaption and application to cyberthreats. The approach has been applied to other policy areas with considerable benefit to our understanding of contemporary security issues and in finding ways to actively address them. To shift responsibility to the societal sector, a process of de-securitisation is necessary. This involves framing cyberthreats differently, both through general discourse, but also consciously, through policy formulation and in the media. We recognise that this process will be confronted by powerful political, bureaucratic and commercial interests.

In making this argument, we do not propose that military cyberthreats should not be taken seriously, or that the military and intelligence agencies should not have a role in cybersecurity. Buzan’s conceptualisation of security recognised that the military had an ongoing role. The arguments that cyberattacks can be used for force protection and/or in place of the use of military force have merit. What we are arguing for is that the military and intelligence community ‘stay in lane’, recognise the spillover effects of strategic cyberconflict, and are not the lead players in societal security efforts, but play a coordinating role. There are two other potential perils in this approach – the first is that society itself is not coordinated enough to address societal threats effectively. This is rooted in one of the core critiques of societal security as a theory, which is that there has been a tendency to reify societies as independent social agents (Theiler 2003). As others have argued, there has been a reluctance in the private (and indeed societal) sector to take on responsibility or liability for cybersecurity (Carr 2016), especially where it would entail considerable costs and a reluctance by governments to pass on responsibility for security to the private sector (Dunn Cavelty and Brunner 2007). There are very strong headwinds here, including a continued predisposition to use securitising discourse, the ongoing power of the national security state, a deteriorating global geopolitical environment, and the continued dominance of big tech. Nevertheless, it is a fundamental requirement for a more effective, less conflictual cybersecurity environment to emerge. Second, the role that society takes in cybersecurity should not lead to the same practices that intelligence agencies and military institutions have been engaged in, including surveillance, intrusions into privacy and the creation of fear and mistrust within and between communities. In other words, moving towards a societal cybersecurity approach should not entail securitising society itself. This concern has been addressed in some detail through the Foucauldian school of securitisation theory (see Schuilenburg 2012) and highlights that avoiding negative consequences will involve effective multi-stakeholder management of cyber issues at the local level.

### AT: Democracy/Law K---2AC/1AR

#### No link---Coercive democratization is categorically distant from the aff---nuance is key.

Laurence Whitehead 09. Politics Fellow @ Nuffield College. “Losing ‘the Force’? The ‘Dark Side’ of democratization after Iraq” Democratization 16 (2) p. 237-238

In this exploratory article, I have highlighted several main areas for reconsideration. They are illustrative rather than exhaustive, and the points raised are preliminary rather than final. The teleology of liberal universalism is an easy target for criticism. But Iraq should not trigger a wholesale abandonment of that type of analysis. Instead, we need a more complex and nuanced assessment of the interactions between geo-strategic needs and calculations, and the partially autonomous influence of democratic norms and values. Dis-aggregation between sets of cases can help here. Different historical periods, different degrees of exposure to external pressure, and different ‘large region’ settings can all affect both the content and the quality of democratization processes in individual cases. But in the cases of Afghanistan, Iraq, and a few more, we are not just dealing with severe external pressures. Regime change in these cases has been imposed wholesale and coercively in the name of international doctrines of humanitarian intervention and the right to democracy. This category of coercive democratizations may need to be separated out from all the rest. Arguably they are not democratizations at all. At any rate, the declared motives, revealed intentions, and measurable outcomes of such forced regime changes require detached comparative analysis and critical scrutiny. It may be that in the light of the accumulating evidence on these cases, the theoretical arguments for this type of operation will need to be reassessed. I have also touched on the possibility that the ‘quality’ of democracy in the most long-established Western polyarchies could decline as a side effect of their resorting to coercive democratization overseas. This is a very underdeveloped topic, in part because the Iraq experience is so recent and perhaps so atypical. Nevertheless, it merits careful monitoring in the years to come.

#### Their critique cedes democracy---causes authoritarianism and violence.

Jonathan Murphy 10. Senior Lecturer in International Management @ Cardiff Business School. “Democracy? That’s so last year”: exploring the backlash against democracy promotion” Paper presented to Critical Governance Studies conference Warwick University, December 13 – 14 2010 http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/wbs/projects/orthodoxies/papers/101213\_muphy\_j.pdf p. 19-22

There is a long tradition on the Left of ambivalence towards democracy, and scepticism regarding the idea of democracy promotion. There are various underlying reasons which are often present in an undifferentiated amalgam. From Marxism there is doubt about ‘bourgeois democracy’, related to the view that the state is the ‘armed wing of the bourgeoisie’. In other words, the state is not a neutral arbiter between different interests but systematically acts to repress the common interest in favour of the ruling class. Marx was ambivalent about the potential of democracy and although his schema of socioeconomic progress involved the overthrow of bourgeois rule and the installation of a dictatorship of the proletariat, he also indicated that in established democracies such as Britain, transformatory change might be possible through democratic elections. This ambivalence solidified into a full‐blown split in the socialist movement in the first years of the twentieth century with the communist wing arguing that only revolution could bring about real change, while social democrats proposed change through constitutional means, rejecting the concept of revolutionary transformation in favour of democratic gradualism; evolutionary socialism (Bernstein, [1911] 1961). It is important to historically contextualize the debate within the socialist movement about democracy. Universal suffrage was not instituted in any country prior to the beginning of the 20th century, and thus the battle for social justice was waged against largely authoritarian regimes. Once democratic systems were established in the most developed countries, it became crucial to understand why socialists did not automatically win elections. Much of early twentieth Western Marxism was devoted to understanding the phenomenon of workers apparently acting against their self‐interest by voting for – and supporting – anti‐socialist political parties. In this context, the work of Lukacs ([1920] 1967) and Gramsci (1989) on class consciousness, reification, and hegemony is particularly significant. Despite the continued application by Leftist movements and leaders of the Bonapartist model for several decades, particularly in the developing world, there was a gradual acknowledgement within the Left that hegemonic orders in complex contemporary societies depend on multi‐faceted consent. The democratic institutions in contemporary society are only one of the markers of consent, but political movements need to dominate those institutions in order to secure the formal and symbolic legitimacy required to implement a political programme. Therefore, notwithstanding an acknowledgement of the structured disadvantage faced by progressive social movements in the democratic system, engagement with the democratic system is a necessary component of leftist strategy, and rejectionism is likely to disengagement and apathy (Laclau, 2000: 290). Moving beyond instrumental reasons for democratic engagement I would like to present two normative arguments in favour of democracy as an important aspect of the critical governance agenda. First, democracy provides an opportunity for engagement in debate about the nature of society. It is not necessary to accept the arguably naïve precepts of Habermas’s deliberative democracy to comprehend that a social order based on non‐violent resolution of conflict is more likely to present opportunities for egalitarian social change than one enforced by violence that is more likely to be held by elites, or more definitively, violence defines elitism. Mouffe (2000) describes the objective of democratic engagement as agonism. Agonism essentially entails acknowledgement of irreconcilable difference between political programmes, but common acceptance that debate should remain within the institutional framework of democracy. More fundamentally, one of the experiences of actually existing socialism has been that the practice of power is problematic notwithstanding the overt objective with which power is sought and held. Blaug (2000, 2010) argues that the exercise of power leads inevitably to a form of anti‐social madness. Power has a metamorphic effect on personality; “emergence of an overestimated self”, in which its holders tend to lose touch with others’ interests, and tend to disparage and oppress subordinates. Power corrupts both leaders and subordinates, corrupting elites and creating collusion in subordinates through a practice of learned helplessness. Power is internalized and tends to be unseen and internalized. Power holders are generally unaware of the changes in their perspectives and subalterns unaware of their subordination. Hierarchies do have efficiency benefits in certain circumstances, but they have costs in terms of the corruption of power. Complete elimination of hierarchy is impossible, but Blaug believes we can have less hierarchy and more democracy and still achieve organisational effectiveness. Transposing this general argument on the nature and abuse of power to the political arena, it is clear that democracy is necessary to have any possibility for achieving egalitarianism, and further, that the progressive struggle is for the extension of democracy to ever wider domains. Within the development community there is a common tendency to present democracy in terms of its instrumental value in facilitating economic development. There is significant evidence – albeit contested – that democracy facilitates economic growth (Olson, 1993; Siegle et al., 2004; UNDP, 2002). Those who dispute this relationship normally argue not that democracy reduces economic growth but that there is no clear relationship between the two, or that democracy only benefits certain parts of the population such as the middle class (Ross, 2006). Further, there is significant evidence that democracy improves outcomes for measures of human development when controlled for factors such as per capita income, in a wide range of domains including overall population longevity, reduced child mortality, improved nutrition, better child welfare, and improved educational attainment (Harding and Wantchekon, 2010). The logic of the mutually supportive relationship between democracy and development is presented below: However, a stronger argument in favour of democracy is that it is an indissoluble part of development, a perspective made famous by Amartya Sen (1999). Indeed, Sen turns the democracy development debate inside out in arguing that without political rights we cannot define what development means for us and therefore determine our own economic needs: "Political rights, including freedom of expression and discussion, are not only pivotal in inducing social responses to economic needs, they are also central to the conceptualization of economic needs themselves." (Sen, 1999: 154) An important consideration in justifying support to democracy promotion is the perspective of citizens. Numerous surveys have been carried out on public attitudes to democracy, with results that are surprisingly consistent across regions. A great majority of the population, whether living in democracies or under dictatorship, support democratic governance, notwithstanding frequently expressed disappointment in the actual performance of democracies (Shin and Tusalem, 2007). In this section we have considered the merits of democracy from a critical or Leftist perspective. The preference of democratic transformation over revolutionary change is argued on the grounds of the necessity of securing consent through broad legitimacy in complex contemporary societies. From an instrumental point of view, violent overthrow is an unlikely vehicle for improving social equity because by definition the tools of violence are primarily controlled by elites. It is preferable to promote and insist upon non‐violent debate, which does not require a naïve presumption that consensus can be achieved. The work of Ricardo Blaug is helpful in explaining why authoritarian orders of either the Right or Left are unlikely ultimately to benefit the majority of the population. Hierarchical power leads to a type of madness in which leaders lose touch with the needs of the subaltern, and the subaltern in turn tends to become dependent on the Leader. The result will be political decisions consistently benefiting the elite over the masses, with a diminished capacity of subalterns to understand and combat their own repression. This psychological explanation is buttressed with empirical evidence showing improved human development outcomes for democracy, explained by Sen as others as deriving from the necessity of freedom to identify and strive for the realisation of economic needs. Finally, and importantly, a considerable majority of the population, whether living in democracies or dictatorships, consistently supports democracy over authoritarianism.

### AT: Russia Threat Con K---2AC/1AR

#### Russia has ability and intent for conflict---assuming Russia is peaceful make multiple wars inevitable.

Michael Kofman and Andrea Kendall-Taylor 10/19/21. Michael Kofman is Director of the Russia Studies Program at CNA and a Senior Fellow at the Center for a New American Security. Andrea Kendall-Taylor is a Senior Fellow and Director of the Transatlantic Security Program at the Center for a New American Security. "The Myth of Russian Decline". Foreign Affairs. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/russian-federation/2021-10-19/myth-russian-decline

The problem is that the case for Russian decline is overstated. Much of the evidence for it, such as Russia’s shrinking population and its resource-dependent economy, is not as consequential for the Kremlin as many in Washington assume. Nor should the United States expect that Russia will automatically abandon its course of confrontation once President Vladimir Putin leaves office. Putin’s foreign policy enjoys widespread support among the country’s ruling elite, and his legacy will include a thicket of unresolved disputes, chief among them that over the annexation of Crimea. Any disagreements with the United States are here to stay.

Put simply, Washington cannot afford to fixate on China while hoping to simply wait Russia out. Rather than viewing Russia as a declining power, U.S. leaders should see it as a persistent one—and have a frank conversation about the country’s true capabilities and vulnerabilities. Rethinking American assumptions about Russian power would allow policymakers to address what will be a period of prolonged confrontation with a capable adversary.

FAULTY ASSUMPTIONS

Expectations of Russian decline contain important truths. The country’s economy is stagnant, with few sources of value other than the extraction and export of natural resources. The entire system is rife with corruption and dominated by inefficient state-owned or state-controlled enterprises, and international sanctions limit access to capital and technology. Russia struggles to develop, retain, and attract talent; the state chronically underfunds scientific research; and bureaucratic mismanagement hinders technological innovation. As a result, Russia lags considerably behind the United States and China in most metrics of scientific and technological development. Military spending has largely plateaued in the last four years, and the population is forecast to decline by ten million people by 2050.

With such a dismal outlook, it is natural to assume that Russia’s capacity for disruption and hostility on the international stage will soon diminish, too—that the Kremlin will simply run out of resources for its aggressive foreign policy. But those data points miss the broader picture. They highlight Russia’s weaknesses and downplay its strengths. Russia may be “a downshifter country,” as Herman Gref, the head of Russia’s largest bank, complained in 2016. But its economic, demographic, and military potential will remain substantial, rather than entering a precipitous decline.

Consider the country’s economy, which, stagnant as it may be, is still larger and more resilient than many believe. Analysts like to point out that Russia’s GDP of $1.5 trillion is comparable to that of Italy or Texas. But that $1.5 trillion is calculated using market exchange rates. Factor in purchasing power parity, and it balloons to $4.1 trillion, which would make Russia the second-largest economy in Europe and the sixth-largest in the world. Neither measure is wholly accurate—one is likely an underestimate, the other an overestimate—but the comparison shows that Russia’s economy is nowhere near as small as the conventional wisdom holds. At any rate, raw GDP is often a poor measure of geopolitical power: it no longer translates easily into military potential or international influence.

To be sure, Russia’s economy has not been kind to its citizens. Real disposable incomes are ten percent lower today than they were in 2013, wiping out nearly a decade of growth. But macroeconomic indicators are stable enough to allow Moscow to project power well into the future. After Russia’s annexation of Crimea and occupation of eastern Ukraine in 2014, international sanctions and falling oil prices caused its economy to tumble. In the years since, however, the government has reined in its spending and adapted to lower oil prices, creating budget surpluses and a growing war chest. The latest estimates, as of August 2021, put the value of Russia’s National Wealth Fund at about $185 billion and its foreign currency reserves at $615 billion—hardly a picture of destitution. A new policy of import substitution, devised in response to international sanctions, has breathed new life into the agricultural sector, whose exports now rake in more than $30 billion annually. The Kremlin has also reoriented trade away from the West and toward China, currently its number one trading partner. Trade with China is expected to exceed $200 billion by 2024, twice what it was in 2013.

What of Russia’s dependence on extractive industries? Oil and gas sales continue to account for about 30–40 percent of the government’s budget, meaning that a future shift away from fossil fuels will sting. But it is unclear how near that future really is. And Russia produces energy at such a low price that other exporting countries are likely to get squeezed well before it sees its budget crimped. In addition, Russia is the main energy supplier to the European Union, whose dependency has only grown over the past decade: the EU gets 41 percent of its natural gas, 27 percent of its oil, and 47 percent of its solid fossil fuels from Russia. The problem Moscow faces is that its resources are not infinite. Russia’s oil production will peak in the coming decade—some think it may have done so already—meaning that the country’s capacity to export easily extractable (and thus cheap) oil will hit a ceiling.

Meanwhile, although Russia lags behind the United States in technological innovation, it still ranks among the top ten worldwide in research-and-development spending. In the case of artificial intelligence, it may not even matter whether the country is a leader or a follower: given the many applications and the commercial utility of this technology, Moscow will likely realize some second-mover advantages while letting the United States and China take on the costs and risks of pioneering its development. Moreover, Russia has a struggling but viable technology sector and has developed its own analogs to Facebook, Google, and other popular online platforms, all of which are fairly successful within Russia.

OF MILITARY AND MEN

Among the most common misconceptions about Russia is that the country’s demographic outlook will dramatically constrain its future capabilities. Such demographic determinism has historically failed to predict Russia’s fortunes. According to UN forecasts, Russia’s population will shrink by about seven percent by 2050; more pessimistic projections see a decline of up to 11 percent. Even in the latter case, Russia would remain the most populous country in Europe and Eurasia by a wide margin. It may lag behind highly developed Western countries in life expectancy and mortality rates, but it has substantially narrowed those gaps since the 1990s. The country is certainly not on the brink of demographic collapse.

More important, the relevance of demographics to state power needs rethinking. Modern great powers are defined not by the size of their populations but by their populations’ quality: people’s health, educational levels, and labor productivity, among other indicators. Were it otherwise, countries such as Bangladesh, Indonesia, and Nigeria would be among the world’s most powerful states. As the American scholar Hal Brands has written, “All things equal, countries with healthy demographic profiles can create wealth more easily than their competitors.” On this front, Russia has shown considerable improvement since the 1990s, with reduced mortality, increased lifespans, and an improved fertility rate. Until 2015, it steadily rose on indexes such as the UN’s Human Development Index and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development’s labor productivity measures. An economic recession has since slowed down this trend, and undone some of the progress, but Russia’s overall situation has considerably improved from a demographic crisis in the 1990s and predictions of demographic doom in the early years of this century.

Brain drain remains a major problem, with many of Russia’s brightest leaving the country. Its economic impact, however, has been difficult to measure. And even as many middle-class Russians who are essential to the knowledge economy leave, Russia benefits from substantial immigration by job seekers from the former Soviet republics. Russia’s demographic profile is composed of mixed indicators that show qualitative improvements alongside quantitative decline. Meanwhile, the demographic outlooks for many of the United States’ allies and partners are equally problematic, if not more so.

MILITARY MIGHT

Above all, Russia will remain a military force to be reckoned with. Military power has historically been a Russian strength, compensating for the country’s relatively undiversified economy, technological backwardness, and lack of political dynamism. It is in part why Russia managed to sustain prolonged competitions with economically much stronger states in the past, whether it was the United States or the British Empire. After its nadir in the early post-Soviet era, Russian military power has been revived—and will only improve in the coming decade, even as American policymakers turn their attention to China.

Russia remains the United States’ primary peer in nuclear weapons technology. Aside from NATO, it also fields the strongest conventional military in Europe, reforged following a period of military reforms and investments since 2008. That transformation was largely overlooked prior to 2014, which explains why Russia’s military moves in Ukraine and, later, in Syria took many analysts by surprise. Today, the Russian military is at its highest level of readiness, mobility, and technical capability in decades. NATO remains superior on paper, but much is contingent in war, and NATO’s apparent superiority does not guarantee victory or the ability to deter Russia across the range of possible conflicts. Russia also fields a flexible array of special forces, mercenaries, and military intelligence operatives. This is before considering the country’s status as a leading power in space or its extensive cyberwarfare capabilities, which were recently demonstrated by the so-called SolarWinds breach, in which Russian hackers penetrated and spied on several U.S. government agencies.

Adjusting for purchasing power parity and for the peculiarities of autarkic defense sectors such as Russia’s, analysts have estimated that Russia spends somewhere between $150 billion and $180 billion per year on defense, considerably more than the market exchange rate figure of $58 billion suggests. Half of Russia’s annual defense budget is spent on procuring new weapons, modernizing old ones, and researching military technology, which is a far greater share than is spent in these areas by most Western militaries. Those, moreover, are conservative estimates, since some Russian expenditures remain hidden, obscured, or classified. Using these generous budgets, the Russian military-industrial complex has developed many next-generation weapons, from hypersonic missiles to directed-energy weapons (such as lasers), electronic warfare systems, advanced submarines, and integrated air defenses, along with antisatellite weapons of various types.

The Russian military is not without its problems and remains a laggard in some areas. In practice, however, Russia is well positioned to remain a dominant actor in the post-Soviet space and to challenge U.S. interests in other regions, such as the Middle East. Russia retains the airlift and sealift capabilities needed to deploy its troops at some distance from its borders. Its defense spending looks stable at current levels, despite the triple shock of an economic recession, low oil prices, and international sanctions. The Russian military still sees itself as a relative underdog, but it has grown more confident that it can deter NATO even without nuclear weapons, and the outcome of a prolonged war between Russian and NATO forces is difficult to predict. Under these circumstances, the United States and its allies should stop dismissing Russia as a mere “disrupter” and recognize it as a serious military adversary in both ability and intent.

IT’S NOT JUST A PUTIN PROBLEM

Tied up in the narrative of Russian decline is the notion that the United States primarily has a Putin problem—that once the Russian president leaves office, his country’s foreign policy will grow less assertive. Yet that is unlikely to be the case. For one thing, Putin can legally remain in office until 2036, thanks to a referendum that he pushed through last year that allows him to serve two more six-year terms after his current term expires in 2024. Research that one of us (Kendall-Taylor) conducted with the political scientist Erica Frantz showed that such longevity is common for leaders like the Russian president. In the post–Cold War era, autocrats who, like Putin, had made it to 20 years in office, were at least 65 years of age, and had concentrated power in their own hands ended up ruling for 36 years, on average.

Research on longtime authoritarian leaders also suggests that once Putin does depart—even if earlier than expected—there will be little prospect for substantial political improvement. Most often, the regimes that such longtime leaders create persist, or a different dictatorship emerges. The odds that democratization will follow a regime like Putin’s—run by an older, personalist leader who has clung to power for 20 years or more—are less than one in ten. Extending term limits, as Putin did after last year’s referendum, is also a bad sign. According to data from the Comparative Constitutions Project, 13 leaders around the world pursued term-limit extensions in the period from 1992 to 2009. In all but one case, their regimes either are still in power or simply transitioned to a new authoritarian regime after the leader’s departure.

This is not to suggest that Russia is doomed to authoritarianism or that a change in the president would not matter. Nonetheless, the empirical record shows that the actions longtime authoritarian leaders typically take to ensure control—such as undermining civil society and hollowing out institutions that could constrain their power—create barriers to the emergence of democracy. Likewise, a mere change in leadership would likely matter only at the margins. Unless Putin’s departure ushers in a significant turnover in the ruling elite, key pillars of Russian foreign policy, such as the notion that Russia maintains the right to a sphere of influence in the post-Soviet space, will remain incompatible with the values of the United States and its allies. Simply put, American policymakers must prepare for the possibility that the contours of Russian foreign policy, and thus the Kremlin’s intent to undermine U.S. interests, will endure long after Putin leaves office.

THE PERSISTENT POWER

The United States should think of Russia not as a declining power but as a persistent one, willing and able to threaten U.S. national security interests for at least the next ten to 20 years. Even if China proves to be the more significant long-term threat, Russia will remain a long-term challenger, too—a “good enough” power, as the political scientist Kathryn Stoner has put it, with the ability to shape global affairs and substantially affect U.S. interests. The former Soviet space remains a tinderbox, still reckoning with the dissolution of the Soviet Union, which should be thought of not as an event but as a process, as the historian Serhii Plokhy has aptly put it. No matter how much Washington would like to focus on the Indo-Pacific, therefore, it must consider the prospect of another Russian-Ukrainian war, a military conflict resulting from political unrest in Belarus, or crises akin to the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war.

Compared with China, Russia also poses a more significant danger to the U.S. homeland. For one thing, it remains the United States’ preeminent nuclear threat, despite China’s growing arsenal of strategic nuclear weapons. The same goes for Russia’s ability to reach the continental United States with long-range conventional missiles. Russia also has more troops stationed abroad than does China, with bases in the Caucasus, Central Asia, Europe, and the Middle East, putting its military in regular proximity to U.S. and NATO forces. When it comes to indirect warfare, Moscow’s record of election interference and hacking demonstrates that it can and will employ emerging technologies against the United States and its allies. It is also worth underscoring that the Kremlin can endanger U.S. interests on the cheap. Russia’s military interventions in Ukraine, Syria, and Libya have been limited and inexpensive. So, too, are its cyberattacks and disinformation efforts.

It is perhaps in these domains—cyberwarfare and attacks on liberal democracy—where Russia is likely to pose the most sustained threat. Russia has refined a low-cost toolkit that allows it to bolster other authoritarian regimes, amplify illiberal voices in established democracies, poison information ecosystems, and subvert elections and other democratic institutions. Since Moscow believes that weakening democracy can accelerate the decline of U.S. influence, it will persist in its efforts on this front. Other states have taken note of Russia’s success in this sphere and have begun to emulate it, as shown by China’s adoption of Kremlin-style information warfare during the pandemic.

A final concern is that Moscow is increasingly finding common cause with Beijing. In effect, the two governments have formed a strategic partnership, exchanging technical and material support to offset Western pressure and focus their resources on competing with the United States rather than with each other. Their defense and military cooperation has grown, too. The impact of this alignment will be greater than the sum of its parts, amplifying the challenge to U.S. interests that each state poses individually. The challenge, therefore, will be not just properly prioritizing China and Russia in U.S. strategy but recognizing that the problems presented by the two countries are not necessarily discrete and separable.

RIGHTSIZING RUSSIA

Washington must move past the myth that Russia is a beleaguered or cornered state, lashing out in recognition of its own demise. In truth, there is little evidence that Russia’s leaders see their country in this way—on the contrary, they consider Russia to be the center of power in its own region and an assertive player globally. Events such as the bungled U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan only reinforce Moscow’s perception that it is rather the United States that is in decline. Ignoring that view will create false expectations for Russia’s behavior, leaving the United States and its allies poorly positioned to anticipate Russian actions.